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A rich but tractable variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model of wage setting behavior is formulated
and a dynamic market equilibrium solution to the model is defined and characterized. In the model,
firms cannot commit to wage contracts. Instead, the Markov perfect equilibrium to the wage setting
game, characterized by Coles (2001), is assumed. In addition, firm recruiting decisions, firm entry
and exit, and transitory firm productivity shocks are incorporated into the model.
Given that the cost of recruiting workers is proportional to firm employment, we establish the existence
of an equilibrium solution to the model in which wages are not contingent on firm size but more productive
employers always pay higher wages. Although the state space, the distribution of workers over firms,
is large in the general case, it reduces to a scalar that can be interpreted as the unemployment rate in
the special case of homogenous firms. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique. As the dimension of













d-mortensen@northwestern.eduequilibrium is unique. As the dimension of the state space is equal to
the number of ﬁrms types in general, an (approximate) equilibrium is
computable.
1 Introduction
The model studied in this paper is one in which employers set the wage
paid, in the tradition of Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983), Bur-
dett and Mortensen (1998), Coles (2001) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2010). It diﬀers from these papers by introducing recruiting behavior at a
cost of the form estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007), ﬁrm entry and exit,
and a transitory ﬁrm productivity shock. Like Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2010) our purpose is to propose a rich but tractable dynamic variant of the
Burdett-Mortensen model that can be used for both macro economic and
policy applications. Following Coles (2001), the paper develops the implica-
tions of a sub-game perfect solution in Markov strategies to the wage setting
game when ﬁrms cannot precommit to contracts that specify future wages.
Interest in this case arises because the Burdett-Mortensen solution is not
generally time consistent.
In the environment studied, there are many workers and ﬁrms, indeed
ac o n t i n u u mo fe a c h . Aﬁrm can have many workers in the model. As is
standard in this literature, every agent, worker and ﬁrm, is risk neutral and
acts to maximize the expected present value of future income. Workers,
employed as well as unemployed, randomly seek job vacancies that arise only
sequentially. Each ﬁrm chooses a current wage and recruiting strategy and
each worker follows a job acceptance and quit strategy that are respectively
optimal given those of all other agents under rational expectations regarding
the future evolution of the market state. For the speciﬁcation of the cost of
recruiting and hiring considered, one in which the cost is proportional to the
number of employees, the wage paid and the hiring strategy pursued by any
ﬁrm are both independent of ﬁr ms i z e .T h i sf a c tp r o v i d e st h es i m p l i ﬁcation
needed for tractability without violating the empirical relationships found in
micro ﬁrm data.
In the language of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010), a market equilib-
rium is rank-preserving if the rank of each ﬁrm’s lifetime wage oﬀer in the
market wage oﬀer distribution is its rank in the distribution of productivity
at every point in time. In such an equilibrium, turnover is eﬃcient in the
2sense that every worker moves from a less to a more productive ﬁrm when
an opportunity arise. Although Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) demon-
strate the existence of a recursive rank-preserving equilibrium, restrictions
on initial conditions are required. Speciﬁcally, because the wage strategy is
size dependent in their model, higher paying ﬁr m sm u s tb el a r g e ri n i t i a l l y .
Unfortunately, this condition is violated in real data because ﬁrms die and
new ﬁrms enter relatively small, independent of productivity. Although this
possibility is incorporated in our model, their condition is not needed because
a ﬁrm’s size does not directly aﬀe c tt h eo p t i m a lw a g ec h o i c eg i v e nt h ec o s t
of hiring and recruiting function assumed.
Given the restrictions on primitives needed to guarantee the existence of
bounded values for all agents in our model, we show that an essentially unique
recursive rank-preserving equilibrium exists in the special case of equally
productive ﬁrms. Formally, any equilibrium solution is isomorphic to the
unique stable saddle path of a ordinary diﬀerential equation system that
describes the adjustment dynamics of the value of a job-worker match and
aggregate employment to their unique steady state values. In the case of
ﬁrm heterogeneity with respect to productivity, we establish the existence
of at least one rank preserving equilibrium when the distribution of ﬁrm
productivity is approximated by a discrete distribution.
Menzio and Shi (2010) develop and study a recursive model of directed
search that also allows for search on-the-job. In their paper, they suggest
that directed search is a more useful approach for understanding labor mar-
ket dynamics. They claim that models of random search in the Burdett-
Mortensen tradition are intractable because the decision relevant state space
is the evolving distribution of wages, which is of inﬁnite dimension. Although
the directed search model in arguably simpler in some respects, their prin-
cipal objection to a random search model is simply not valid in the variant
considered in the paper. The shape of the wage oﬀer c.d.f. at any point
in time is an equilibrium outcome of the wage and recruiting behavior of
ﬁrms and the acceptance and quit strategy of worker with a location deter-
mined by the distribution of employment over ﬁrm types. Hence, at least as
an approximation, the decision relevant state variable is a ﬁnite vector that
characterizes this distribution. Indeed, in the special case of identical ﬁrms,
the state variable is simply the aggregate level of employment.
A troublesome implication of the original Burdett-Mortensen model for
empirical implementation is that the implied equilibrium oﬀer and wage dis-
tributions are convex while in the data they are unimodal and well approx-
3imated by the log normal (See Christiansen et al. (2005)). Although a
unimodal distribution is possible when ﬁrms diﬀer in labor productivity,
Mortensen (2003) shows that model is not consistent with both the ﬁrm
wage distribution and the distribution of ﬁrm productivity in Danish data.
The theoretical distribution of productivity which is consistent with the wage
distribution is far more skewed to the right than that observed. The incon-
sistency reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a th i g hw a g eﬁrms have much less incentive to
compete for workers by paying a higher wage than do low wage ﬁrms be-
cause workers only move up the wage ladder.
The Coles (2001) solution to the wage setting game, supported by ap-
propriate quit behavior of employees, is such that every ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between oﬀering a high wage and the workers’ common reservation wage.
Like the Burdett-Mortensen model, ﬁrms of equal productivity do pay dif-
ferent wages. However, the high wage which is actually paid in equilibrium
is simply equal to the saving in turnover costs that would have to be in-
curred where the reservation wage paid instead. In the special case in which
recruiting costs are primarily those associated with processing applications
and training workers rather than advertising the job opening, this condition
implies that the equilibrium distribution of oﬀers is uniformly distributed
over the set of ﬁrms that are equally productive. Furthermore, the oﬀer
density is decreasing when ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity. Finally, the proper-
ties of the employment weighted distribution of wage, a distribution which
is stationary only in steady state, can be quite complex.
2 The Model
2.1 Speciﬁcation
Time is continuous, has an inﬁnite horizon and all discount the future at rate
0. The labor market is populated by a unit measure of equally produc-
tive, risk neutral immortal workers. Every worker is either unemployed or
employed, earns a wage if employed, and the value of home production,  ≥ 0,
if not. There is also a measure of risk neutral, heterogeneous ﬁrms. Market
output is produced by matched workers and ﬁrms with a linear technology.
New ﬁrms enter at rate 0 continuing ﬁrms die at rate 0 so that
the measure of ﬁrms is stationary and equal to  At entry, the produc-
tivity of a new ﬁrm  is determined as a random draw from the c.d.f. Γ0()
4Continuing ﬁrms are subject to a technology jump process characterized by a
given arrival rate  ≥ 0 and a distribution of new values Γ1() The common
support of both distributions is [] and, for ease of exposition, Γ0Γ1 are
continuous functions (no mass points). As in Klette and Kortum (2005) and
Lentz and Mortensen (2010), one can think of the entry ﬂow as ﬁrms with
new products and the exit ﬂow as ﬁrms that are destroyed because their
product is no longer in demand.
Given the above productivity and turnover processes, it is a straightfor-
ward algebraic exercise to compute the stationary distribution of ﬁrm pro-
ductivity Φ() and show that it is a continuous and increasing function over
[] It is convenient, however, to instead rank ﬁrms by their productivity;
i.e. a ﬁrm with productivity  is equivalently described as having rank
 ∈ [01] solving  = Φ() Deﬁning ()=Φ−1() each ﬁrm is then
characterized by (;) where  describes its rank (with corresponding pro-
ductivity  = ())describes its (integer) number of employees and  the
aggregate state vector.
Throughout we only consider stationary (Markov) equilibria where the
market state process {} is Markov and known to all agents. As all agents
are small, each takes this process as given. At time  in state  =  ﬁrm
(;) generates expected discounted proﬁt Π(;) by paying wage  =
(;) to each of its employees and by recruiting additional employees
at an expected rate  = (;). (;) denotes a worker’s expected
lifetime wage when employed by such a ﬁrm while () denotes the expected
value of being unemployed. Below we will derive the information relevant
state from the structure of the model. To ﬁxi d e a s ,h o w e v e r ,i ti su s e f u lt o
deﬁne () as the distribution of employment across ﬁrms in the market
at time  In what follows, this distribution function can be considered as
the market state variable  Given this state variable at time  and the
wage strategies of ﬁrms, one can then compute () deﬁned as the date
 proportion of workers who enjoy lifetime value at least as great as 
As no employee ﬁnds   acceptable, () then describes the date
 unemployment rate Finally for  ≥  () − () is the date 
proportion of workers who are employed with lifetime value  or less.
New ﬁrms enter with a single worker, the innovator. Once a new ﬁrm
enters, the innovator sells the ﬁrm to risk neutral investors for its value and
reverts to his/her role as a worker. Each ﬁrm faces costs of expanding its
labour force. Suppose ﬁrm (;) posts  vacancies and, with a random
contact technology, let () d e s c r i b et h er a t ea tw h i c ht h i sﬁrm contacts
5potential new employees. As employment at the ﬁrm yields worker value
 = (;) then () is the probability that a randomly contacted
worker is willing to accept the job oﬀe r .T h u st oh i r ean e we m p l o y e ea tr a t e
 the ﬁrm must post  vacancies satisfying  = ()() Note that
ﬁrms which pay lower wages need to post more vacancies to achieve a given

There are two costs to the recruiting and hiring workers. First  de-
scribes the direct cost of posting  vacancies to attract the required number
of hires Second and perhaps more importantly, vetting job applicants and
training new hires is costly. Let  describe the ﬁrm’s recruitment eﬀort
required per employee. If each employee contributes to the recruiting process
equally, the cost of hiring at rate  is () where () describes the per




where we () is increasing and strictly convex by assumption.
At rate  each worker, whether employed or unemployed, conceives a new
business idea and so has the opportunity to start-up a new ﬁrm. We assume
the worker always chooses to accept the opportunity and so  describes the
entry rate of new ﬁrms. This of course requires that an employed worker
always prefers to quit to start-up a new ﬁrm rather than remain employed
with its existing ﬁrm, a condition which holds under the assumption that new
ﬁrms are suﬃciently more productive than continuing ﬁrms. Of course, this
requirement holds automatically when each new product is more valuable
than the one it replaces as in the model of Klette and Kortum (2004).2
Finally, given ﬁrm (;) oﬀers value  = (;), employees quit
at rate (;)= + ()[1 − (;)] where  i st h er a t eo fﬁrm creation
per employee, () is the job oﬀer arrival rate per employee, and (;) is
the probability that any outside job oﬀer is less than or equal to . These
objects are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
1This formulation of costs of adjustment is standard in the literature. As a case in
point, see Merz and Yashiv (2007).
2This restriction is made for simplicity. Were it not so, then the entry decision is
endogenous to the process under study. Adding this complication is both realistic and
worth pursuing but goes beyond the scope of this paper.
62.2 The Wage Setting Game
With precommitment at date  =0o nt h ee n t i r ep a t ho ff u t u r ew a g e s ,
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010) construct Markov Perfect Equilibria to
the extended Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework [BM from now on]
where wage strategies are conditioned on initial ﬁrm size. Here we assume
no precommitment on future wages and consider the continuous time limit
 → 0+. Suppose in the model described above that a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium exists in which the equilibrium wage strategy of ﬁrm (;) is
to set wage  = (;) with probability one (independent of the pre-
vious history). Further suppose this wage strategy yields lifetime value
(;)  () to its employees Consider then the following wage de-
viation - the ﬁrm sets wage  =0  I nt h es u b g a m e( a f t e ra  0 delay),
the ﬁrm’s strategy implies it reverts with probability one to the equilibrium
wage 0 = (0 0;0) But as  → 0 Coles (2001) argues this wage devia-
tion is always proﬁtable. The reason is transparent in the steady state case:
if employees at the highest wage ﬁrm always expect wage  = , their quit
strategy is unchanged if the ﬁrm (only momentarily) announces  =0  But
this cannot describe (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior as the ﬁrm can
then proﬁtably deviate by (always momentarily) announcing  =0 3
T h ed y n a m i ci n c o n s i s t e n c yi nB Mi st h a to n c eaﬁrm has grown to be large
then, rather than announce a high wage  it is strictly better oﬀ by announc-
ing the worker’s reservation wage  (to extract incumbent employee search
rents). Coles (2001) identiﬁes a dynamically consistent (Markov) equilibrium
where instead each ﬁrm (;) has two optimal strategies: the equilibrium
wage path  = (;) which we will refer to as the high wage path, and
the rip-oﬀ strategy  = (;) w h i c hl e a v e se a c he m p l o y e ei n d i ﬀerent to
quitting into unemployment (but does not do so by convention) The ﬁrm’s
equilibrium (Markov) pricing strategy (for   0 but arbitrarily small) is:
(a) if last period the ﬁrm announced wage 0 ≥ (0 0;0) then announce
3The argument clearly extends to mixed strategies. It essentially establishes there
cannot be a Markov perfect equilibrium with   (any ﬁrm will deviate to  =0 )  A
MPE exists if it is assumed workers cannot quit until the end of the   0 period: in that
c a s et h eu n i q u eM P Ei st h a ta l lﬁrms pay  =  and there is no quit turnover. Conversely
if instead workers can quit at the start of the period and all other ﬁrms oﬀer  =  then
 =  +  is a proﬁtable deviation. As the only candidate MPE is that  =  aM P E
cannot then exist. We believe the latter scenario is the more interesting case as it presumes
ﬁrms can precommit to a higher wage to attract new employees, though only for a (very)
limited period.
7 = (;);
(b) if last period the ﬁrm announced wage 0  (0 0;0) then announce
 = (;)
Note the critical property: if the ﬁrm ever announces a wage below the
high wage path (;), employees expect the rip-oﬀ strategy thereafter.
This switch in employee expectations on future wages generates a suﬃciently
large change in turnover behavior that setting wage below (;) is never
proﬁt increasing. Speciﬁcally the arguments developed in Coles (2001) es-
tablish for   0 but arbitrarily small:
(i) announcing a deviating higher wage 0  (;) has such a small
impact on turnover that oﬀering 0 = (;) is strictly more proﬁtable;
(ii) announcing 0 ∈ ((;)) which implies workers expect the
wage  =  in the entire future, has such a small impact on turnover that
oﬀering 0 =  is strictly more proﬁtable; while
(iii) oﬀering 0  say 0 =0  implies all workers quit (they anticipate
 =  in the entire future) and so yields zero proﬁt.
Coles (2001) shows this equilibrium (as  → 0) yields the original (steady
state) outcome described in BM when the discount rate  is arbitrarily small.
The approach is particularly useful here for two reasons. First the equilibrium
wage path  = (;) remains Markov and so can be embedded into a
non-steady state framework. Second it yields two key simpliﬁcations:
(i) the rip-oﬀ strategy  =  implies each ﬁrm with () and  ≥ 1
must make strictly positive proﬁt;
(ii) for all  t h eh i g hw a g ep a t hi m p l i e s(;) ≥ 4 Thus unem-
ployed workers and workers employed at ﬁr m su s i n gt h er i p - o ﬀ strategy will
accept the ﬁrst (outside) job oﬀer received.
2.3 The Reservation Wage
Because individual workers are hired and quit sequentially, the number of
employees in a continuing ﬁrm is a stochastic process. Indeed,  is a birth-
death process with an absorbing state that occurs when the ﬁrm dies. That
is, the ﬁrm’s labor force size is an integer that can only transit from the value
 to +1if a worker is hired, from  to −1 i faw o r k e rq u i t s ,o rt oz e r oi ft h e
ﬁrm loses its market in any suﬃciently short time period of length   0 .
4  generates zero proﬁt and this strategy is then dominated by the ripoﬀ strategy
(strictly if ()  )
8The transition rates for these three events are respectively the hire frequency
(;), the quit frequency (;), and the destruction frequency .
Deﬁne c Γ0()=Γ0(()) and c Γ1()=Γ1(()) for  ∈ [01] Consider a
worker in ﬁrm (;) that follows the equilibrium high wage path (;).
The value of employment or lifetime wage (;) solves the recursive
equation:











[Π(1;)+(1;) − (;)]c Γ0()
+( − 1)((;);)[( − 1;) − (;)]




In other words, the ﬂo wv a l u eo fe m p l o y m e n ti se q u a lt ot h ew a g ei n c o m ep l u s
the expected capital gain associated with the possibility of ﬁrm destruction, a
ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity shock, being oﬀered a better job, creating a business
start-up, a quit by another employee, a new hire, and the passage of time,
all conditional on the market state . The latter term captures the eﬀect on
 through the non-steady state evolution of  over time.
The equilibrium construction requires the ﬁrm is everywhere indiﬀerent
between sticking to the high wage path or deviating (in perpetuity) to the rip-
oﬀ strategy  = (;) where () i st h ew a g ea tw h i c ha ne m p l o y e ei sj u s t
indiﬀerent to quitting into unemployment. Now the value of unemployment











Should the employer deviate by instead paying the worker’s reservation wage















































where () describes the ﬁr m ’ so p t i m a lr e c r u i t m e n tr a t eg i v e nt h er i p - o ﬀ
wage strategy. As the construction of equilibrium requires (;)=
() for all (;) then substituting out  in the latter expression and
comparing with the Bellman equation for  implies that the reservation
wage,
(;)= (3)
is the value of home production in all circumstances.
2.4 The Size Independent Wage and Recruiting Policy
We now establish that the equilibrium wage strategy is size independent. In
t h ec a s eo fa no p e r a t i n gﬁrm with  ≥ 1 employees the value of this ﬁrm
(;) is deﬁned recursively by
( + )Π(;)=m a x
≥0
* (() − (;)) − 
()() − ()
+ [Π( +1 ;) − Π(;)]
+[ + (;)][Π( − 1;) − Π(;)]
+
R 1
0 (Π(;) − Π(;))c Γ1()+Π

+
where the right hand side contains the current cash ﬂow, the return to re-
cruiting an additional employee, the cost of losing an employee, the likelihood
of a productivity shock and the passage of time respectively.
The equilibrium construction requires the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent to the rip-oﬀ
strategy which, by equation (3), is to set  =  in perpetuity (and thus yield




* (() − )) − 
()() − ()
+ £















where () i st h ee m p l o y e eq u i tr a t ea se a c hl e a v e st ot h e i rﬁrst outside
job oﬀer. Deﬁne  =  which is recruitment eﬀort per employee in
the deviating strategy.5 It is immediate that the solution to this equation
is Π(;)=(;) where (;) which describes the value of each
employee, solves
( + )(;)=m a x
≥0
* () −  − 
()() − ()
+[ −  − ()](;)
+
R 1




As Π(;)=Π(;)=(;), then the Bellman equation for Π()
reduces to:
( + )(;)=m a x
≥0
* () − (;) − 
()() − ()
+[ −  − (;)](;)
+
R 1




As () is size independent it is immediate that the equilibrium wage ()
must also be independent of size  With a slight abuse of notation, we now
write  = (;) and note the lifetime value of employment must also be
size independent; i.e.  = (;)
Before simplifying the model further, it is important to note this size-
independence result is not solely a consequence of the assumed cost struc-
ture (). At this stage we could set () to zero, so that the only cost to
hiring workers is the standard vacancy posting cost, and the size indepen-
dence result remains. The essential diﬀerence to previous work is that here
ﬁrms can directly control the hiring margin with a recruitment strategy 
leaving the ﬁrm’s wage strategy to control its employee quit rate. Indeed we
5by assumption the ﬁrm using the rip-oﬀ strategy can recruit unemployed workers as
 ≤ 
11show below that the equilibrium wage paid depends only on the return to
reducing employee quit rates. Instead when wages are used to control both
the recruitment rate of new employees and the quit rate of existing employ-
ees, as in BM, Coles (2001) Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2010), the resulting
equilibrium structure of wages is very diﬀerent. We discuss this issue further
in the Conclusion.
2.5 A Baseline Case
The model simpliﬁes if the cost of posting a vacancy, ,i st r i v i a l . T h e
cost of adjustment function estimated by Merz and Yashiv (2007) provides
empirical support for the relevance of this case. In the notation of this
model, they estimate a cost of recruiting and hiring function of the form
( + 01), which is a special case of that speciﬁed above since the hire
rate is linear in the number of vacancies posted. Although the estimates
of the non-linear component play a large role in explaining the dynamics of
factor adjustment as well as the ability of their model to explain ﬁrm market
values, their point estimate of the linear component is slightly negative and
statistically insigniﬁcant. Hence, the restriction  =0is consistent with
their ﬁndings. Furthermore, this evidence that labor adjustment costs are
primarily processing and training costs rather then those associated with
advertising seems to be consistent with everyday experience.
Deﬁne the recruitment eﬀort function as

∗()=a r gm a x
≥0
[ − ()]
When  =0 , the optimal equilibrium and deviating recruiting policies are
the same, both given by (;)=∗(()) Furthermore equations (4),(5)
imply
(;)= +[ () − ((;);)](;) (6)
=  + ()((;);)(;)
as (;)=+()[1−(;)] Note the wage premium − equals the
saving through the reduced quit ﬂow attributable to paying the higher wage.




 =m a x
≥0
½






12where the dot refers to the time derivative  and captures the dynamics
due to the non-steady state evolution of  The analysis presented in the rest
of the paper is restricted to this case.
3 Rank Preserving Equilibria
3.1 Comparative Dynamics
A wage policy function (;) that is strictly increasing in  for every state
of the market , is said to be rank-preserving in the sense that the rank
of a ﬁrm’s wage in the wage oﬀer distribution is the same as its rank in
the productivity distribution in every market state. As workers voluntarily
move only from worse to better paying ﬁrms, a market equilibrium is rank-
preserving in the sense of Moscarini and Postel-Vinay if the equilibrium wage
policy function is rank preserving.
We ﬁrst establish that () is increasing in ; i.e. higher productivity
ﬁrms enjoy higher employee values.
Proposition 1 The value of an employee (;) is unique, continuous and
increasing in  for every .








() −  + 
R 1
0 (;)c Γ1()








where  denotes the expectation with respect to information available at
time .G i v e nt h a t()(;) is continuous and increasing in  if (;) has
these properties,  maps the space of bounded, continuous and increasing
functions in . Hence a ﬁxed point of the map exists, is unique and has the
property stated.
Anticipating that higher productivity ﬁrms have a greater marginal will-
ingness to pay for a lower quit rate, we focus on rank-preserving equilibria
where (;) is indeed increasing in  Given higher productivity ﬁrms pay
higher wages, it is immediate that lifetime values (;) are also increas-
ing in  As both () and () are increasing in  the wage equation (6)
conﬁrms that the equilibrium wage () increases with 
13A rank-preserving equilibrium yields the following simpliﬁcation: that
b (;) ≡ ((;);) describes both the fraction of job oﬀers made by
ﬁrms with type no greater than  and also the fraction of job oﬀers which
have value no greater than (;) By further deﬁning the worker surplus
function (;)=(;) − () equations (1) and (2) imply:
( +  +  +  + ())(;) −
·
 (8)







where (;) ≡ 
Proposition 2 If (;) is continuous and increasing in  for every ,t h e n
the surplus value of employment, (;)−() is unique, positive, contin-
uous and increasing in .
Proof. Any forward solution to equation (8) is a ﬁxed point of the continuous





















Obviously,  maps the set of bounded, increasing and continuous functions
of  into itself under the hypothesis. Hence, any ﬁxed point of the map is
u n i q u eh a st h ep r o p e r t y .
3.2 Aggregation
From now on we restrict attention to optimal wage policy functions which are
rank-preserving and conﬁrm the existence and uniqueness of such a policy
as part of the characterization of the equilibrium. This section aggregates
across the wage oﬀer and hiring strategies of ﬁrms and so identiﬁes job oﬀer
propensities () b (;) consistent with a rank-preserving equilibrium.
Recall that each ﬁrm employs an integer number of workers. Suppose at
date ,t h eﬁrm of rank  has () employees. In the limiting case of a
continuum of ﬁrms and by the law of large numbers, ()=
R 
0 ()
14describes the total number of workers employed at ﬁr m sw i t ht y p en og r e a t e r
than 
Suppose now in state  =  at date  ﬁrm (;) adopts optimal re-
cruitment rule  = (;) where  = ∗(()) Recall that to hire at this
expected rate, the matching process requires the ﬁrm posts  (;) vacan-















If  denotes the number of unemployed workers at time  a rank preserving
equilibrium further implies
((;)) =  + ()









As job oﬀers are random and there is a unit mass of workers, the arrival rate























153.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
In principle the aggregate state variable  at time  is the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes for each type  which we previously denoted () For each
ﬁrm (;) however, both the wage strategy (;) and recruitment eﬀort
strategy (;) are ﬁrm size independent. In what follows we show () is
as u ﬃcient statistic for the market state.
Fix a rank  ∈ [01] For any such , a rank preserving equilibrium implies
() evolves over time according to the following diﬀerential equation:
˙ ()=()b (;) + [1 −  − ()]c Γ1() (11)
−
³
 + [1 − c Γ0()] + [1 − c Γ1()] + ()[1 − b (;)]
´
()
where the dot refers to the time derivative  and unemployment  =
1 − (1) The inﬂow includes those unemployed who are hired at a ﬁrm no
greater than  and those employed at a ﬁrm with productivity 0 which
receives shock  ≤  The outﬂow contains those whose job is destroyed, who
leave to start-up a ﬁrm, whose employer enjoys a favorable productivity shock
and employees who receive a more favorable outside oﬀer (and so quit). We
now formally deﬁne equilibrium where  = () is the aggregate state vari-
able. We use the following standard notation: that as  evolves according
to the above deterministic process, the wage policy function  = (;())
implies the wage at rank  evolves according to ()=(;)
Deﬁnition Given state  = () a stationary rank preserving equilibrium is
aw a g ep o l i c yf u n c t i o n(;()) and hire rate policy (;()) that
satisfy










with  =1 − (1) Further along the equilibrium path, ()=
(()) and () are solutions to the system of ordinary diﬀerential
16equations composed of equation (11) together with
( +  +  +  + )() − ˙ () (15)
= () −  + 
Z 1
0
()c Γ1()+m a x
≥0
h() − ()i
Finally, an equilibrium is a particular solution to this diﬀerential equa-
tion system consistent with the initial distribution of employment 0 :
[01] → [01] and the transversality condition
lim
→∞()
− =0∀ ∈ [01] (16)
The following mild regularity conditions guarantee that a unique solution
exists to the system of ordinary diﬀerential equation for every speciﬁcation
of initial conditions:
Assumption 1: ∗() is Lipschitz continuous.6
To identify an upper bound for (;) suppose in the rip-oﬀ strategy that
()=0(its employees never quit) and  =1 =0so that its productivity
is always  The corresponding maximal payoﬀ  is then deﬁned by equation
(17) below. To guarantee existence of an equilibrium, we require the following
restriction on fundamentals.
Assumption 2: A positive solution for  exists to
 =m a x
≥0
½
 −  +m a x ≥0 { − ()}
 +  + 
¾
 (17)
Assumption 2 implies the following upper bound on .
Proposition 3 In any stationary rank-preserving equilibrium, the recruit-
ment rate () is bounded above by the eﬀective rate of time discount, i.e.,
(;) +  +  for all ().
Proof. By the Envelope Theorem, the RHS of equation (17) is an increasing,
convex function of  with slope ∗()( +  + ) As the RHS is strictly
positive at  =0then, given a positive solution exists for  it implies
∗() ++ The proposition then follows as () ≤  for all  and
∗() is an increasing function.
6Thus, () increasing and strictly convex with the properties (0) = 0(0) = 0 are
suﬃcient conditions.
173.4 Homogenous Firms
Although it is true that the market state () is of inﬁnite dimension in
the general case, it need not be so in practice. In this section we fully
characterize the unique recursive rank-preserving equilibrium in the limiting
case of homogenous ﬁrms.
In the homogeneous ﬁrm case we suppose () is (arbitrarily close to)  for
all  By construction, each ﬁrm  is indiﬀerent to using the rip-oﬀ strategy.
As the rip-oﬀ strategy does not depend on  -t h eﬁrm posts wage  = 
indeﬁnitely - then (;) cannot depend on  in the limiting homogenous
ﬁrm case. Let  = (;) denote the value of an employee in each ﬁrm
in the limiting case. Optimal recruitment eﬀort  = ∗() is thus also
independent of .T h e d e ﬁnition of equilibrium then implies the job oﬀer









Thus conditional on equilibrium hiring intensity ∗() the job oﬀer arrival
rate only depends on () through the implied unemployment level  =
1−(1) Given the limiting case of homogenous ﬁrms, we can further restrict
the aggregate state vector to  = , which is a scalar. Employee value
 = () and aggregate unemployment  e v o l v ea c c o r d i n gt ot h ep a i ro f
autonomous diﬀerential equations:
˙  =(  +  +  − 
∗()ln) −
µ






 = (1 − ) − [ − 
∗()ln] (20)








( +  +  − ∗()ln) − ( −  +m a x ≥0 { − ()})
 − [ +  − ()ln]

It is well known that a unique continuous solution exists to this equation for
all  ∈ [01] if and only if the ODE system composed of (19) and (20) has a
unique steady state solution and the steady state is a saddle point. Indeed,
the branch of the saddle path that converges to the steady state for every
initial value of aggregate unemployment is the equilibrium value of a match
function. Below we prove that these necessary and suﬃcient conditions hold.
18Any steady state solution is the () pair deﬁned by the pair of equations
 − ( + ) = −
∗() ln (21)
( +  +  − 
∗()ln) =  −  +m a x
≥0
{ − ()} (22)
We ﬁrst show there exists a single solution pair () to these equations.
Equation (21) describes the
·
 =0locus drawn in Figure 1 below. The
LHS of (21) is zero at  = 
+  1 and decreases at the constant rate
 +  For any 0 the RHS is zero at  =0 1 is positive and strictly
concave in  for  ∈ (01) Hence a unique, positive value of  strictly less
than ( + ) exists for every positive value of .A s∗() is an increasing
function, it follows that  decreases as  increases with limiting properties
 → ( + ) as  → 0 and  → 0 as  →∞ 
Equation (22) describes the
·
 =0locus in Figure 1. The RHS does not
depend on  is strictly positive at  =0and, for  ∈ [0] the Envelope
Theorem implies it is a strictly increasing function of  with slope ∗() 
 +  +  [Proposition 3]. The LHS is instead zero at  =0and is a strictly
increasing function of  with slope strictly greater than  +  +  Thus if
a solution exists to equation (22) it must be unique. Note further that at
 =1  the unique solution is  =  As the LHS is decreasing in  it follows
that a solution for  ∈ [0] exists for all  ∈ [01] where  increases as 
increases with limiting properties  → 0 as  → 0 and  =  at  =1 
Continuity now implies a unique steady state solution for the pair ()
exists and steady state  ∈ [0( + )]
T h ed y n a m i c si m p l i e db yt h eO D Es y s t e mc o m p o s e do f( 2 0 )a n d( 1 9 )a r e
illustrated by its phase diagram portrayed in Figure 1. The intersection of
the two singular curves is a saddle point that attracts a unique converging
saddle path from any initial value of . Finally, because the growth rate in 
o nt h eu n s t a b l ep a t ha b o v et h es a d d l ep a t hm u s te v e n t u a l l ye x c e e dt h er a t e
of interest, while the unstable path below the steady state ultimately yields
zero  (which contradicts optimal ﬁrm behavior) the stable path represents
t h eo n l yM a r k o ve q u i l i b r i u m .
Proposition 4 A unique stationary rank-preserving equilibrium exists in the
limiting case of equally productive ﬁrms. Further equilibrium () increases
with unemployment.
19Figure 1: Phase Diagram
20The phase diagram and the equilibrium adjustment path have a natural
interpretation as a dynamic supply and demand model for match formation.
Of course, the value of an employee  is the relevant price. A higher employee
value induces greater recruiting eﬀort which yields greater utilization of the
available labor force by reducing unemployment duration, a relationship rep-
resented by the downward sloping
·
 =0singular (supply) curve. However,
the (demand) price  increases at the margin with  along the ˙  =0curve
because lifetime wages decrease with aggregate unemployment. Along the
optimal adjustment path, the price adjusts in response to "excess demand"
to bring the supply and demand prices into balance.
Note that any common and unanticipated positive shock to the produc-
tivity of a match  shifts up the dynamic "demand" curve [the ˙  =0curve]
i nF i g u r e1b u th a sn od i r e c te ﬀect on "supply." The result is an increase in
the steady state value of employment () and a decrease in unemployment
() as in the canonical search and matching model. Hence, the equilibrium
value of  jumps up initially and then adjusts slowly downward along the
path converging to the new steady state value.
It is straightforward to back out equilibrium micro-behavior: the equilib-







with  = () This expression conﬁrms that () is indeed rank preserving,
where (0;)= is the lowest wage paid. Although equilibrium () is
independent of () this is not the case for the induced wage dispersion ()
Thus even at steady state  wage dispersion (and quit turnover) dynamics
are non-trivial. Furthermore there are additional composition eﬀects if ()
lies away from its steady state.
The equilibrium quit rate is
((;);)=−
∗()ln[ + ()]
which is decreasing in  being −∗()ln at  =0(the bottom rank ﬁrm)
and zero at  =1 .N o t eaﬁrm’s equilibrium quit rate depends directly on the
level of unemployment. This occurs as ﬁrms are more likely to recruit from
the pool of unemployed workers the larger is that pool. As each quit costs
the ﬁrm  in continuation payoﬀ,e a c hﬁrm is thus better oﬀ with higher
unemployment as competing ﬁrms are then less likely to poach one of its
21employees. Indeed it is this poaching externality which explains why, outside
of steady state, equilibrium () is increasing in .
Wage dispersion arises as hiring is costly and ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent wages
to reduce their employee quit rates. As in BM, the wages oﬀered are ranked
by productivity  where higher ranked ﬁr m sp a yh i g h e rw a g e sa n de n j o y
l o w e rq u i tr a t e s .U n l i k eB M ,h o w e v e r ,t h e r ei sn os i m p l ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e n
wages and ﬁrm size. Here instead high rank  ﬁrms enjoy high expected
growth rates equal to ∗()[1+ln[ + ()]]Thus a ﬁrm’s growth rate is
independent of its size  depending only on its productivity rank  within the
set of all competing ﬁrms, the level of unemployment, where  = () and on
the distribution of ﬁrm sizes () The expected growth rate of employment
depends only on whether or not  exceeds its steady state value. Across
surviving ﬁrms, ﬁrms with  satisfying  +()  1 ' 037 have positive
expected growth rates, while lower rank ﬁrms have negative growth rates.
Current ﬁrm size () thus evolves according to a geometric Markov process
where currently large ﬁrms will typically have existed for a longer time and
enjoyed higher than average growth rates.
3.5 Heterogeneous Firms
This section now generalizes the analysis to a ﬁnite number of ﬁrm types.
Let  represent the productivity of ﬁrms of type  =1 ; i.e. ()=
for all  ∈ (−1 ] ⊆ [01] where the set (−1 ] represents the set of
ﬁrms of type  and 0 =0   =1 . As the value of an employee is the
same for all ﬁrms of the same type, let ()=(;) for  ∈ (−1 ],
 =1 2,d e n o t et h ev a l u eo fa ne m p l o y e ei nt y p e ﬁrms in aggregate state
 v =(1 2)denotes the corresponding vector of employee values. Let
 = () denote the number of workers employed in ﬁrms of type  or less
and N =(1 2)denotes the corresponding vector. Note unemploy-
ment  =1−  Recall that c Γ1() − c Γ1(−1) describes the probability
the of productivity shock  ∈ [−1 ] With no loss of generality we set
c Γ1()= so that the set {} describe the probability distribution of type
 shocks. For simplicity, suppose all new start-ups have initial productivity
 = .
With ﬁnite types, we describe equilibrium where  = N describes the
22relevant aggregate state vector. In this case, equation (14) implies
















1 −  + 
1 −  + −1
¶
=1 2 (23)
Letting (v;N)=(v;N) denote the equilibrium job oﬀer arrival rate,
equation (15) can then be written as
˙  =(  +  +  +  + (v;N)) (24)
−
Ã
 −  + 
X






The laws of motion for the distribution of employment over types  are
described by:
˙  = (v;N)[1 − ]+[ − ] + Γ0 (25)
−
Ã






1 −  + 
1 −  + −1
¶!

where Γ0 =0for and Γ0 =1(i.e. new ﬁrms have initial type  = )
Given Assumption 1, the right hand sides of the above diﬀerential equa-
tions (24),(25) are Lipschitz continuous provided that   1 Thus for all
N satisfying
1 −  + 
1 −  + −1
 0
the system of ODE has a unique solution for every set of initial conditions
satisfying the inequality.
For a stationary (Markov) equilibrium, we seek a particular solution to
the system that can be represented as a function v(N) that map the set
of employment distributions into the feasible set of vector values given that
map is used to solve for the evolution of the distribution of employment. An
equilibrium, then, is a ﬁxed point of the transformation  deﬁned by the
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 (N)[ − −1]







23where N is the backward solution to the laws of motion for the employment
distribution, equation (25), conditional on the given initial distribution of






















1 −  + 
1 −  + −1
¶
Any function v(N) that is a ﬁxed point of the map () is a recursive
stationary equilibrium. As it maps the set of Lipschitz continuous functions
into itself and this set is equi-continuous, closed and convex, existence of a
ﬁxed point follows by Schauder’s theorem if the set is also bounded in the
supnorm.
Proposition 5 With a ﬁnite number of ﬁrm types, a stationary rank-preserving
equilibrium exists if there is positive initial unemployment; i.e.  =1 −0 
1.
Proof. To complete the proof, we need only show that  maps the set of
Lipschitz continuous functions that are bounded in supnorm into itself. We
consider the bound  deﬁned by Assumption 2 and  deﬁned by















Note that 1 if 0  1
Let kk =s u p ∈F || represent the supnorm. As (vN) ≤ (vN)
for all ,a n d0 ≤  ≤  if 0 ≤  ≤ ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that
() (N0) ≤  and()(N0) ≤ 1
Now for  =  the law of motion for  reduces to
·
 =[  + (v;N)][1 − ] − 











where (vN)= +  + (v;N)
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Hence with  = (v;N):













































































 −  + 







 −  +m a x ≥0 { − ()} + 
 +  +  + 
= ∞
25by deﬁnition of  and Assumption 2.
4C o n c l u s i o n .
We have shown the introduction of a hiring margin into the matching frame-
work with on-the-job search yields a surprisingly rich and tractable equilib-
rium framework. We have fully characterized and established the existence
of rank-preserving equilibria in dynamic, non-steady state economies. The
environment considered is particularly rich. There is turnover of ﬁrms with
innovative start-up companies replacing existing ﬁrms which suﬀer ﬁrm de-
struction shocks. There is quit turnover where, in equilibrium, workers quit
low productivity ﬁr m st ot a k ee m p l o y m e n ti nh i g hp r o d u c t i v i t yﬁrms. Even
with no precommitment by ﬁrms on future wages, equilibrium wage disper-
sion arises as higher productivity ﬁrms are willing to pay a higher wage to
reduce employee quit rates. Furthermore ﬁrm growth rates are size indepen-
dent: high productivity ﬁrms pay higher wages, enjoy low quit rates, recruit
new employees with greater eﬀort and so enjoy a positive expected growth
rate. The converse is the case for low productivity ﬁrms. The structure
also allows for ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity shocks, so that previously successful
ﬁrms may ultimately decline should they receive an unfavorable productivity
draw.
The characterization of equilibrium is particularly simple in the limiting
case of equally productive ﬁrms. Even though the distribution of ﬁrm sizes
is inﬁnitely dimensional, equilibrium aggregate behavior depends only on the
level of unemployment. A particularly useful insight is that the value of a
ﬁrm is increasing in the level of unemployment. This occurs as, with higher
unemployment, ﬁrms are less likely to poach each others’ employees. As a
quit is costly to the ﬁrm (it is costly to hire a replacement), this poaching
externality implies an employee is more valuable (more likely to stay) as
unemployment increases. As greater employee value implies ﬁrms respond
by increasing recruitment eﬀort, the equilibrium dynamics of the economy
are intrinsically stable.
This new rich and tractable framework opens up several important direc-
tions for future research. The equally productive ﬁr m sc a s ei si m p o r t a n ta s
equilibrium dichotomizes into (i) macroeconomic behavior where, depending
only on the level of unemployment  equilibrium determines gross job cre-
ation rates and (ii) microeconomic behavior where wages and quit turnover
26at the ﬁrm level depends on a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect  the collective recruitment
eﬀort of ﬁrms (determined in the macroequilibrium) and the distribution of
ﬁrm sizes which itself evolves endogenously over time. Given the Markov
structure of the model, it is clear the model will generalize to a framework
where aggregate productivity  and job destruction parameter  evolve ac-
cording to a stochastic Markov process. The extension is interesting not only
because ﬁrms use optimal wage setting strategies, rather than Nash bargain-
ing, but also because the insights of Coles and Moghaddasi (2011) suggest
this framework will ﬁt the business cycle volatility and persistence data as
described in Shimer (2005). Indeed the model will automatically generate
procyclical quit turnover: high aggregate productivity  will increase ﬁrm
hiring rates, thus increasing worker quits from the lower end of the type x-
distribution. Furthermore periods of high unemployment will have lower quit
r a t e sa sn e w l ya v a i l a b l ej o b sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob eﬁlled by the unemployed.
An important distinction between this paper and the BM approach is
t h a ti nt h el a t t e rf r a m e w o r kt h ew a g eh a dt od ot w oj o b s :w a g e sw e r eu s e d
both to attract new employees and to retain existing employees. Here instead
the hiring margin is fully targeted by recruitment strategy, leaving wages to
target only the quit margin. The resulting equilibrium wage structure is dif-
ferent. Preliminary work suggests the properties of the wage oﬀer density are
more akin to the data. Furthermore the employment weighted distribution
of wages, a distribution which is only stationary in the steady state, can be
quite complex.
The equilibrium wage structure considered here relies on a reputation
eﬀect: that if the ﬁrm ever announces a low wage, its employees forever
anticipate the rip-oﬀ wage  =  in the future. It is well known in inﬁnitely
repeated games that allowing reputation eﬀects can support a multiplicity
of equilibria. The same is true here. The key is that if employees forever
expect wage  =  in the future, then paying a higher wage for an instant
  0 has (almost) no eﬀect on turnover. Thus given those beliefs it is
optimal simply to pay  =  An alternative construction, then, is that the
high wage strategy (;) may instead yield strictly greater proﬁtt h a n
the rip-oﬀ strategy. The wage path () r e m a i n sc r e d i b l ea sa n yd e v i a t i o ni s
punished by employee expectations  =  i nt h ee n t i r ef u t u r e( a n di st h u sl e s s
proﬁtable).7 The approach taken here, however, is not only more tractable
(it describes a Markovian wage process), we believe it is the more persuasive
7we are grateful to Ludo Vischers for pointing out this possibility
27case for two reasons.
First for the equal productivity case, the alternative approach implies a
ﬁrm exists with ∗  0 which makes strictly greater proﬁtt h a nd o e sﬁrm
 =0(which pays  = ) Firm  =0would clearly like to adopt the wage
policy (∗;) as this yields greater proﬁt. Further its employees would
also be better oﬀ if its ﬁrm did adopt this wage policy (which is diﬀerent
to, and thus more generous than the rip-oﬀ strategy). The only reason the
ﬁrm does not do this, however, is because its employees insist on expecting
wage  =  in the entire future. Although consistent with subgame perfect
behavior, this outcome does not seem compelling: it seems more reasonable
that the ﬁrm and its employees should coordinate (renegotiate) to the jointly
preferred ∗ wage policy. Note that the equilibrium structure above rules out
jointly preferred wage policies - workers strictly prefer a higher  wage policy
(;) while ﬁrms do not. All ﬁrms, being indiﬀerent to the same rip-oﬀ
strategy, enjoy the same equilibrium payoﬀ.
Second, a diﬀerent approach is to introduce asymmetric information: that
ﬁrms know their productivity () but workers only observe a history of
wages paid. Indeed there is a large wage bargaining literature based on
this assumption. Preliminary work (with wage setting by ﬁrms) identiﬁes a
fully revealing equilibrium where higher productivity ﬁrms announce strictly
higher wages and so enjoy strictly lower employee quit rates. Further in
the limit as productivity dispersion disappears, each ﬁrm  makes the same
expected proﬁt. This limiting equilibrium (with asymmetric information)
h a sp r o p e r t i e sv e r ys i m i l a rt ot h eo n ei d e n t i ﬁed above.
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